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chinA in AfRicA: cuRing the ResouRce cuRse 
with infRAstRuctuRe And modeRnizAtion
by Jeremy Kelley*
Seven billion is the number of human beings on this planet and that number is growing. How to provide food, clean water, shelter and jobs for this population, in ways 
that enhances and nurtures the Earth’s natural resources and 
ecosystems while supporting our survival, is the challenge of our 
times. Ever since the first Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992, we have known that sustainable development is the way 
to meet this challenge. Sustainable development is living within 
our means, leaving plenty for our grandchildren, and ensuring 
everyone has a reasonable opportunity to lead a decent living. 
However, the lack of political will on the part of governments, 
social and environmental irresponsibility on the part of corpo-
rations, and inertia to adopt a sustainable life style on the part 
of citizens, have collectively contributed to this failure. To 
succeed in sustainable development at the quality, scale and 
speed needed to meet the challenge, we need strong working 
partnerships between governments, corporations and citizens 
based on trust. Trust among partners is built through openness, 
accountability, and participation.1
InTroduCTIon
Africa is a continent of nation states created without regard 
to race, ethnicity, or the territorial interests of its inhabitants.2 
Mismanaged for years by imperial powers that were simply 
looking for ways to reap the benefits of its resource wealth, it 
is understandable that Africans are sometimes skeptical of 
Western influence and loan programs — a skepticism that the 
global South made apparent in the negotiations leading to the 
1992 Rio Declaration.3 With the economic and political rise of 
China, African nations now have choices that were previously 
unavailable to them. China represents another source of fund-
ing for infrastructure and industrial development in Africa. But 
how will differences in the way China invests impact African 
development?
This article will examine what an increase in Chinese 
investment means for the African continent. Part II examines 
what is meant by “sustainable development” and considers how 
it can be achieved. Part III details China’s investments in Africa: 
its history, recent growth, and areas of focus. Finally, part IV 
returns to the question of how Chinese investment may influence 
African development. 
The whaT and how oF  
susTaInable developmenT
defining sustAinAble develoPment
Development is a value-laden concept and the definition can 
vary depending on which societies are deemed the benchmark 
of successful development; often this means ‘development’ 
with ‘westernization.’4 Certainly, even from a solely economic 
perspective, sustainable development entails not only economic 
growth, but an emphasis on structural change as well.5 To create 
sustainable economic gains, the increased share of the industrial 
sector is important for those developing countries that are typi-
cally dependent on primary exports, such as agriculture and nat-
ural resources.6 This is especially apparent in some oil-exporting 
countries which experience sharp increases in GDP but don’t see 
changes in their economic structure.7 But, viewing development 
in purely economic terms ignores many other factors that influ-
ence the lives of people in developing nations. These other social 
and political factors have become an ingrained part of how we 
now define sustainable development.
The United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (“UNCED”), held in Rio de Janeiro from June 
3 to 14, 1992, presented a chance to re-envision development 
policy and practice following the end of the Cold War.8 Freed 
from the “distorting shadow of superpower conflict,” the devel-
oping countries of the global South began to assert themselves 
more heavily.9 While ostensibly focused on environmental issues 
raised by the North, UNCED was in fact steered toward issues 
of sustainable development by the South, as reflected by the Rio 
Declaration which culminated the work at UNCED.10 
The Rio Declaration highlighted the growing importance of 
governance in development11 and the role of state cooperation 
in developing a sustainably supportive international economic 
system.12 Inherent in the Rio Declaration was the notion that 
development is more than just a factor of economic growth, but 
must also include active encouragement and participation by 
civil society,13 effective access to justice,14 and an awareness of 
those traditionally marginalized in society.15 Above all, the Rio 
Declaration was a proclamation that developing countries had a 
right to decide how they would develop16 and that development 
was “interdependent and indivisible” with concerns of peace and 
the environment.17
Measuring development should also include “social indi-
cators” such as life expectancy, literacy, nutrition, access to 
health services, and so forth.18 A country may grow rapidly in 
terms of economic growth, but lag behind in these important 
areas that impact peoples’ everyday lives. In his classic work, 
“Development as Freedom,” Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen’s 
broadened development include and to focus on the concept 
of freedom.19 Life expectancy, literacy, nutrition, and access 
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to health services, after all, are expressions of an individual’s 
freedoms to health and an education. Sen defines five distinct 
types of freedom: 1) political freedoms, 2) economic facili-
ties, 3) social opportunities, 4) transparency guarantees, and 
5) protective security.20 These freedoms are not only the end 
goals of development, but they are also the primary means for 
development.21 These freedoms are inextricably intertwined. For 
example, a freer political environment would generally be more 
conducive to liberal economics and growth than a repressive 
regime.22 People will feel more comfortable investing in a coun-
try if they know that it is secure from hostile foreign or domestic 
forces, evincing protective security freedom.23 
Strong economic growth is not necessary for the advance-
ment of other areas of development.24 However, it is self-evident 
that a strong, growing economy can provide more opportunities 
and resources to address development problems, especially if the 
solutions are resource intensive, like improving infrastructure. 
That which encourages political and social freedom will also 
encourage economic development while the reverse is also true–
political and social repression hinders economic development.25 
The Rio Declaration and the associated principle of 
socio-political development have come to define a version of 
sustainable development that calls for something beyond mere 
economic growth. However, this ethos could be challenged as 
China experiences an economic boom without the corresponding 
growth in political freedom.26 This is already affecting develop-
ment in Africa because China, unlike many Western countries, 
does not emphasize the development of other social indicators as 
preconditions for economic development assistance. 
sPuRRing economic gRowth
While sustainable development encompasses more than 
just economic growth, it is generally agreed that, especially in 
the poorest countries, economic growth is a crucial component 
of development.27 Economies can grow by promoting a number 
of factors such as increased efficiency, enhanced education, 
technological change, accumulation and investment of capital, 
and the exploitation of natural resources.28 In many developing 
countries these “modern” means of economic growth coex-
ist with traditional economic sectors.29 An inherent problem 
in dualist economic structures is that they foster economic 
and social gap between the modern and traditional means of 
economic growth30 and, as a result, there are high levels of 
income inequality.31 In Africa, one way this dualism can be seen 
by viewing extractive industries amongst traditional or early-
stage modernizing economies. 
The way a society approaches dualism and structural 
change can either promote or hinder growth.32 For example, 
reinvestment from agrarian sectors toward industrial sectors, the 
encouragement of entrepreneurship, and creation of capital can 
drive a country to the point of establishing sustainable growth.33 
Although less developed countries will initially lag behind more 
developed countries as they gradually develop traditional sectors 
into modern ones, those less developed nations can catch, and 
even overcome, developed countries if they remain committed to 
this policy.34 While each country must take its own path toward 
modernization, all long-term success will undoubtedly involve 
structural transformation.35 
it’s A tRAP! nAtuRAl ResouRces And  
bAd goveRnAnce. 
“With hard work, thrift, and intelligence, a society can 
gradually climb out of poverty, unless it gets trapped.”36 
A short-sided reliance on the exploitation of primary 
resources as an engine of growth is a temptation that confronts 
many African nations and could possibly jeopardize long-term 
sustainable growth.37 Primary exports can encourage economic 
growth in a number of important ways.38 They can provide a 
source of surplus foreign currency that eases import of those 
capital goods and intermediate goods that are needed to modern-
ize an economy.39 They also provide linkages to other industries, 
forward and backward, on the chain of production.40 For exam-
ple, an oil-exporting nation could develop a refining industry. 
Primary exports also provide a source of income for local popu-
lations which, if spent in the domestic economy, will increase 
the demand for manufactured goods that can be translated into 
domestic production.41 Taxes on primary exports can provide 
an important source of revenue for poor governments that can 
be reinvested in other development sectors — social, health, 
infrastructure, or other programs.42 However, over-reliance on a 
single sector of an economy can spell ruin. Without the develop-
ment of a co-existing industrial sector to offset the exploitation 
of primary resources, especially extractive industries, an econ-
omy can easily fall into the resource trap and its accompanying 
problems of corruption, misgovernance, and underdevelopment. 
The resource trap (or resource curse) consists of three parts: 
1) Dutch disease, 2) susceptibility to fluctuations in commodity 
prices, and () negative political and institutional effects.43 Under 
Dutch disease, named after the effects the discovery of gas in the 
North Sea on the Dutch economy in the 1960s, resource exports 
cause a country’s currency to rise in value against other curren-
cies, making the country’s other export activities uncompeti-
tive.44 In moderation, this affect can be positive for development 
because the surplus in foreign currency can be used to import 
goods needed for industry.45 Taken to the extreme, however, the 
devaluation of domestically produced goods destroys any exist-
ing export market and, as local services, agricultural products, 
and manufactured items become more expensive, resources are 
diverted away from production.46 Instead of building a diverse, 
modern, industry-driven economy, countries plagued by Dutch 
Disease find themselves unable to create competitive agricul-
tural or industrial exports, thereby limiting their chances for 
sustainable economic growth.
Resource-dependent economies are also susceptible to 
fluctuations in world commodity prices.47 The result is a boom 
and bust cycle: the economy is flushed with money when com-
modity prices are high, but starved for revenue when the prices 
drop.48 When there is a great excess of wealth, governments 
tend to spend on all sorts of projects whether they are needed or 
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not.49 During the lean times, living standards start to fall and the 
government must make tough choices about what must be cut. 
This cyclical boom and bust makes it difficult for electorates to 
judge whether the government is making wise use of money or 
investing in great mistakes.50 
Above all, “[t]he heart of the resource curse is that resource 
rents make democracy malfunction.”51 Corruption and misgover-
nance are the effects of patronage politics that too often become 
the standard when massive resource rents find their way into a 
democratic society.52 Furthermore, the more ethnically diverse a 
society, the more patronage politics comes into play; this is one 
reason why Africa experiences such grand corruption.53 
In a resource state, the government is less accountable to 
the people. First, because there is less need to tax the popula-
tion, citizens are less apt to scrutinize how tax income is spent.54 
Second, resource dependence erodes governmental checks and 
balances, leaving the electoral competition unconstrained and, 
when combined with patronage and ethnic division, parties can 
use the resource rents to buy votes, rig elections, or simply force 
opposition parties out of power.55 
“The resource-rich, ethnically diverse societies need a 
democracy that is distinctive in having a strong emphasis on 
political restraints relative to electoral competition.”56 In the 
alternative, these countries will likely misuse resources and miss 
the chance to invest resource income in ways that drive economic 
modernization and diversification. Caught in a downward spiral 
of uncompetitive exports and bad governance, the abundance of 
resources can spell disaster for a developing economy. 
ChInese InvesTmenT In aFrICa
Sino-African trade has recently exploded as China’s growing 
economy requires more resources and markets for its manufac-
tured goods.57 Two-way trade between Africa and China stood at 
10 billion U.S. dollars in 2000, rising to $18 billion in 2003, then 
$50 billion in 2006.58 During this period the average increase in 
trade per year was thirty-three percent.59 Trade surpassed $120 
billion in 2010.60 In the past two years, China has given more 
loans to poor countries than the World Bank.61
histoRy of chinese tRAde in AfRicA
China has been trading with Africa for centuries, dating as 
far back as the Tang Dynasty (618-906 AD).62 Chinese porcelain 
from the 9th century and coins from the 12th century have been 
found across East Africa.63 Early trade, however, collapsed with 
the death of Emperor Yongle and the resurgence of Confucianism 
which promoted agriculture to exploration and trade.64 
Only in the 1960s did China again begin to show inter-
est in Africa. Between 1963 and 1964, Zhou Enlai, then 
Vice-Chairman of the Communist Party of China, made an 
extensive tour of Africa to strengthen Sino-African relations.65 
Foreshadowing the concept of South-South cooperation, he 
advocated mutual economic assistance between “poor friends” 
and attacked the “maltreatment of small and weak countries by 
the big and strong.”66 He pledged that Chinese assistance “would 
respect the sovereignty of the recipient country, would be given 
on generous terms, and would strive to enhance self-reliance.”67 
Modern Chinese investment in African infrastructure proj-
ects was born during this era.68 The 1860-kilometer Tanzania-
Zambia (“Tanzam”) Railroad linking Zambia with the port in 
Dar es Salaam in Tanzania exemplified this new investiture.69 
Employing 50,000 Chinese workers and costing $500 million, it 
has remained one of the most costly infrastructure investments 
China has ever made in Africa.70 However, Chinese investment 
during this time was more ideologically than economically moti-
vated and focused on supporting the region’s guerilla fighters 
and Socialist regimes, such as Julius Nyere’s Tanzania.71 This 
ideological approach to investment ended with the death of Mao 
and the end of the Cultural Revolution, but more economically 
focused development emerged from the economic reforms 
undertaken by the Deng Xiaoping regime.72 
Two key events marked the beginning of the current 
trend of increasing Sino-African trade.73 First, the Tiananmen 
Square demonstrations served to isolate China from the West.74 
Unwilling to criticize China for fear of exposing themselves to 
criticism and hoping to gain support from China, most African 
nations remained silent about the events and worked behind the 
scenes to move into the void that Western isolation had left.75 
Second, the end of the cold war in 1991 meant that the 
economic tug-of-war for African allegiance was at an end76 
and, suddenly, aid and loans from Western nations and insti-
tutions such as the World Bank and the IMF began to come 
with attached conditions.77 African leaders that were once 
accustomed to maintaining power through patronage systems 
of Western funds were now faced with the prospect of losing 
power.78 Increased investment from China, who does not give 
the same weight to concerns of governance and human rights, 
can provide African states with less-encumbered loans and aid, 
addressing the need for capital in Africa and skirting the very 
real issue of misgovernance.
imPAct of the finAnciAl cRisis — the need foR 
cAPitAl
The current global economic crisis has dramatically 
reduced Western foreign direct investment in Africa79 and 
has also reduced the value of commodity assets countries once 
relied upon for export profits.80 The result has been that it is 
“virtually impossible” to raise capital for exploration or devel-
opment of resources.81 This scarcity of capital has negatively 
impacted African infrastructure development.82 According to the 
World Bank’s Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, the 
retreat of investment capital from Africa has made “[infrastructure] 
financing (both debt and equity) more onerous and difficult 
to secure.”83 
While capital is being withdrawn by western investors, 
Chinese institutions have been expanding their investment, 
especially in extractive industries.84 China’s major players in this 
field are not only private investment banks, but also state-owned 
policy banks.85 Jiang Jianqing, Chairman of the Industrial 
Commercial Bank of China (“ICBC”), expressed that Chinese 
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investment in Africa is “growing and becoming more diversi-
fied, even as the global downturn curbs investment by other 
countries.”86 
oil Above All, but theRe is moRe
 Currently, extractive industries remain the central focus of 
Chinese investment in Africa. This investment has turned China 
from the second largest exporter of oil in Asia to the second larg-
est importer of oil in the world in a matter of only nine years.87 
Driven partly by the meteoric increase of cars on Chinese roads 
(estimated to reach 100 million by 2015) and partly by increased 
industrial demands, China expects to import between ten and 
fifteen million barrels of oil per day by 2020 — twice Saudi 
Arabia’s total production and equal to that of the entire African 
continent.88 Currently, Africa supplies thirty percent of China’s 
oil needs, compared to the fifteen percent of demand Africa sat-
isfies for the U.S.89 Approximately seventy percent of African 
exports to China consist of crude oil and an additional fifteen 
consist of other raw materials.90
As a late-comer to the established oil fields such as those 
in Nigeria and Angola, China has had to work hard to make 
inroads against established players.91 For this reason, China is 
actively seeking new fields in Gabon, Niger, Kenya, Uganda, 
and other areas often over-looked by Western states.92 Unlike 
many Western companies, Chinese companies are willing to take 
more risk and will work in more politically unstable regions.93
Oil is not the only resource China is seeking in Africa. While 
oil constitutes seventy percent of African exports to China, an 
additional fifteen percent of exports are in the form of other min-
eral resources.94 In particular, China has been active in pursuing 
sources of cobalt in Africa. Africa produces fifty-one percent of 
the world’s cobalt, of which, eighty-eight percent of that comes 
solely from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”).95 
Recently, Chinese companies, China Railway Engineering 
Corporation (“CREC”) and Sinohydro, have entered into an 
agreement to establish a joint Sino-Congolese venture, named 
Sicomines, that will provide the DRC with China Export-Import 
(“EXIM”) Bank financed infrastructure in exchange for copper 
and cobalt mining concessions.96 The $9 billion venture would 
provide $6 billion worth of road construction, two hydroelectric 
dams, hospitals, schools and railway links to southern Africa, 
to Katanga, and to the Congo Atlantic port at Matadi; the other 
$3 billion was to be invested by China in development of new 
mining areas.97 The deal has recently come under fire as a $23 
million signing bonus for Gecamines, the Congolese partner 
involved, disappeared under allegations of corruption.98 Such 
allegations have unfortunately become standard in Chinese-
financed programs which typically lack even a modest amount 
of transparency.
Is ChInese InvesTmenT In aFrICa  
a Curse or a Cure? 
There is no doubt that Chinese investment presents African 
states with some clear advantages, especially at a time when 
Western investment has declined. Chinese investment could be 
the cure for a continent in need of capital-intensive investment 
in infrastructure and economic modernization. However, it 
is important to bear in mind that sustainable development is 
not solely about economic growth. Without examining the 
potential pitfalls of Chinese investment, particularly the over-
investment in extractive sectors and its accompanying problems 
of misgovernance and dependence on a sole export, the increased 
economic growth may instead end up as a curse for Africa.
cuRes
The Commodities-for-Infrastructure model
“The Chinese Government’s strategy in Africa is starting 
to mimic the approach adopted in the home market itself, one 
that channels sizeable amounts of capital through state-owned 
(policy) banks at key sectors.”99 While this strategy has been 
directed mostly towards direct investment in extractive indus-
tries, a shift has begun to focus on infrastructure development in 
exchange for concessions on resources.100 In 2006, China spent 
$7 billion dollars on infrastructure in Africa; in 2007 China 
invested an additional $4.5 billion dollars.101 
While Africa has been showing robust growth in recent 
years, one major constraint on sustainable development has been 
the poor state of the continent’s infrastructure, which depresses 
productivity by as much as forty percent.102 It is estimated 
that Africa needs at least $93 billion to close the infrastructure 
gap.103 Another challenge to developing infrastructure is the 
current cost of transportation in Africa, which is higher than that 
of other developing regions. According to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, “while freight costs 
for the world on average amount to 5.4 percent of imports, this 
value is up to five times higher for some African countries.”104 
A World Bank study showed that, in 2007, the average cost in U.S. 
dollars to export a container from Africa was $1,649 compared to 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) average of $889.105
Many African states have received financing for thermal 
or hydro power projects to facilitate much-needed electrifica-
tion.106 By the end of 2007, China had provided $3.3 billion 
for hydropower amounting to a 6,000 megawatt capacity, which 
would increase total generation capacity in sub-Saharan Africa 
by 30%.107
Given Africa’s need for infrastructure, China’s infrastructure- 
for-concessions policy may be seen as a win-win situation for 
Africa. As of 2008, China has financed infrastructure projects 
in over thirty-five African countries.108 Yet, criticism tugs at the 
edges of this investment boom. First, Chinese companies often 
use Chinese labor in places where local labor could be used.109 
Instead of the money for infrastructure projects being pumped 
into the local economy, much of it is repatriated back to China 
where it originated. Second, there is little financial or technical 
investment to maintain the infrastructure constructed by Chinese 
workers.110 While African states will benefit from the infra-
structure, the money could also be used to finance employment 
opportunities for African workers. Additionally, there are always 
potential issues of transparency and corruption associated with 
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large investments, as indicated in the DRC Sicomines deal, 
which must be addressed to encourage sustainable development. 
Investment in the Industrialization of Africa
 “As China Inc.’s knowledge and network in Africa deepens, 
the diversification of China’s investment footprint away from 
the energy sector in Africa will become an emerging trend in 
China-Africa commercial ties.”111 There is a hopeful sign in this 
diversification; Chinese companies are increasingly investing in 
manufacturing in Africa in addition to the usual extractive indus-
tries.112 “A Chinese government survey shows the growing use 
of Africa as an industrial base. Manufacturing’s share of total 
Chinese investment (22%) is catching up with mining (29%).”113 
Future Chinese investment in manufacturing could help mitigate 
the negative effects that heavy investment in extractive industries 
alone causes to African export industries.
China announced the “Go Global” strategy in 2000114 as 
a strategy to both develop markets for China’s export products 
and relieve pressure from the accumulation of foreign currency 
as well as develop new sources of energy and raw materials115 
Go Global has encouraged Chinese enterprises to establish 
offshore operations in designated Chinese special economic 
zones (“SEZ”).116 These zones “promote Chinese foreign com-
mercial interests,” “create safe-havens for Chinese capital”, and 
offset “increased protectionist trade practices against Chinese 
companies.”117 
The establishment of these light industrial zones creates 
jobs for local citizens and helps offset the criticism that cheap 
Chinese imports have undermined Africa’s weak manufactur-
ing sectors.118 The African Development Bank recently said of 
the Chinese SEZs, “The special economic zones are expected 
to make a significant contribution to industrialization in Africa 
although their success is by no means guaranteed.”119 This type of 
industrialization could be conjoined with the extractive industry 
to establish forward and backward links in production–such as 
refining and the manufacture of mining machinery–which can 
help diversify and strengthen local economies.120
However, nternational criticism of the SEZs points to the 
employment of large numbers of Chinese laborers in the con-
struction of SEZs and to the procurement of resources exclu-
sively through Chinese channels.121 Too heavy a focus on SEZs 
“could limit progress towards regional integration,” as countries 
compete for investment from China instead of developing local 
capacity.122
cuRses 
Heavy Investment in Extractive Industry May 
Exacerbate the Resource Curse
It is not only the Chinese who come to Africa and heavily 
invest in extractive industries. Western companies have been 
exploiting African resources since the colonial period and con-
tinue to dominate, especially in the oil industry. This has had 
adverse effects on African economies through the resource curse 
and its resultant bad governance. 
Ghana’s Center for Policy Analysis (“CEPA”) recently 
warned that Ghana will likely suffer from the effects of Dutch 
Disease as it begins commercial production of oil.123 To mitigate 
the effects of Dutch Disease, CEPA plans to closely manage 
the exchange rate, perhaps pegging the Ghanaian Cedi to parity 
with the US dollar.124 The economics of Dutch Disease can be 
offset by efficient management of currency, appropriate pacing 
of resource exploitation, and concurrent investment in modern-
izing industry.125 It is the effects that resource rents have on the 
governance of a politically divided, weak, or unstable nation that 
are the most concerning aspect of the resource curse.126
Chinese investment in Africa has the potential to exacerbate 
the misgovernance aspect of the resource curse. While Western 
countries have demanded more of their companies and criticized 
them for investment in nations with poor human rights records, 
China makes no such distinctions. Chinese investment does 
not require recipient countries to implement any kind of anti-
corruption measures, nor does it monitor whether the money 
is appropriately spent or disappears into the pockets of corrupt 
leadership.127 
Addressing the Resource Curse
In general, three interconnecting factors can be addressed 
to encourage appropriate use of resource revenues: (1) transpar-
ency, (2) accountable governance, and (3) economic and political 
policies which take proper account of horizontal and vertical 
divisions of power in the society.128 Even as the Rio Declaration 
has called for further transparency,129 new global initiatives have 
brought transparency in the extractive industries to the forefront 
of development. 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (“EITI”) 
“aims to strengthen governance by improving transparency and 
accountability in the extractives sector.”130 It does so by monitoring 
and reconciling company payments and government revenues at 
the level of individual countries; to be deemed “EITI compliant,” 
each country needs to implement EITI compliant regula-
tions and establish a multi-stakeholder group of civil society, 
government, and private industry representatives to oversee 
implementation.131 
Under ideal conditions, EITI would be a benefit for all 
parties involved: governments would benefit from transparency 
and an anti-corruption stance which would lead to improvements 
in tax revenue and “enhanced trust and stability in a volatile 
sector;” companies would benefit from a level playing field 
where all companies must disclose the same information; civil 
society benefits from receiving reliable information from the 
government and companies; and the energy sector would see 
increased stability which encourages long-term investment.132
While it is empirically inconclusive whether EITI enhances 
a country’s development potential, there are many positive 
signs which have encouraged countries to begin the compliance 
process.133 To date, twenty-one African nations have completed 
or are in the process of obtaining EITI compliance status.134 One 
recent case study suggests that, even in the most pervasively 
corrupt countries, EITI initiatives can shed light on the issues 
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of governance and accountability, even if it offers no certain 
answers.135
Chinese companies working in an EITI compliant country 
are following the reporting framework established by that country 
and, to date, Chinese companies have reported in Gabon, 
Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Nigeria.136 China has expressed its 
support for the EITI “in several international fora,” including the 
UN General Assembly and the G20.137 China could benefit from 
further support of EITI as it would provide more political stability 
when challenging operational environments and would allow 
Chinese companies to compete at an equal level with Western 
companies.138 Because EITI “affirm[s] that management of 
natural resource wealth for the benefit of a country’s citizens is 
in the domain of sovereign governments to be exercised in the 
interest of their national development,” China need not worry 
about moving from its “non-interference” foreign policy.139 
Instead, since EITI is implemented and monitored domestically, 
Chinese companies are merely complying with domestic law 
and that law offers benefits for compliance.140 
Transparency, however, will not solve the problem entirely. 
A government must be accountable to its citizen if disclosure 
of potential corruption is to have any effect.141 Effective anti- 
corruption initiatives are based upon “mass mobilization” and 
hold leaders politically accountable for the misuse of state 
funds.142 Of course, a multi-party democracy is the most obvi-
ous form of accountable governance.143 However, even in a 
dictatorship, mass protest to the misuse of resources may impose 
pressure to reduce corruption.
In order to secure accountability, any development ini-
tiative must take into account a country’s horizontal and 
vertical power relationships.144 This is especially true in multi-
ethnic and divided societies; because trust is a powerful factor in 
governance and corruption, development programs must work 
to establish institutional and economic ties between horizontally 
fractured power structures.145 
AddRessing chinese investment in light of the 
PRinciPles of sustAinAble develoPment
The Rio Declaration urges states to cooperate in promot-
ing sustainable development.146 It also embeds principles of 
transparency and accountability.147 As a direct result, a global 
network of civil society organizations is working to ensure 
access to information, participation, and access to tribunals and 
justice.148 While gaps still remain, norms of accountability are 
gaining force.149 
Rio + 20 looks to further emphasize issues of accountability 
and governance which affect sustainable development.150 The 
High-Level Panel on Global Sustainability recently highlighted 
the “need to integrate economic, social, and environmental 
dimensions” in order to achieve sustainable development.151 
The Panel, in the tradition of the Rio Declaration’s Principle 
1, places humans at the center of sustainable development.152 
Unlike Rio, the Panel calls on humans to “claim their rights 
and voice their concerns” against “persistent inequality which 
offends deeply held universal principles of social justice.”153 The 
socio-economic change needed will only come through transpar-
ent and accountable public-private partnerships.154 The writing 
is on the wall that transparency and accountability are the new 
emphasis in development and that China would be wise to turn 
its investment policy in that direction.
To China, development has been more of an economic 
concept than it is to Western organizations and as portrayed in 
the Rio Declaration. While it is China’s policy not to interfere 
with the political situations in the countries where it invests, it 
must be assured of political stability to ensure the security of 
its investments. Democracy typically provides stability. Through 
support for EITI and other governance initiatives, China may not 
be supporting democracy per se, but is supporting accountable 
governance. 
One promising outlook for African development is the 
increased practice of corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) 
within Chinese companies.155 CSR generally means that compa-
nies will meet “the legal requirements and broader expectations 
of stakeholders in order to contribute to a better society through 
actions in the workplace, marketplace and local community and 
through public policy advocacy and partnerships.”156 Almost all 
Chinese business leaders in Africa surveyed in 2010 were familiar 
with CSR and generally described CSR “in terms of contributing 
to local economic growth and job creation, complying with local 
laws and caring for the environment, and making philanthropic 
donations to support schools and hospitals.”157 Key drivers of 
CSR growth included Chinese government support for CSR, the 
adoption of international standards and collaboration (including 
EITI), and the establishment of CSR training and skills develop-
ment programs.158
It seems Chinese businesses are open to the idea of CSR, 
but as the 2010 study concludes:
One key difference between Chinese and western con-
ceptions of CSR concerns the extent to which they are 
willing to consider whether business practices reinforce 
or undermine local legal and political institutions, par-
ticularly in institutionally weak countries. While the 
Western model for overcoming state corruption in man-
aging natural resource revenues is based on encourag-
ing transparency, the Chinese model has tended to rely 
on direct provision of public infrastructure. This is 
aided by Chinese companies’ access to low-cost and 
long-term capital. However, there is long experience of 
foreign funded infrastructure projects being developed 
in Africa, which do not meet local needs, and are not 
supported with maintenance, which remains a chal-
lenge to this model of business in development.159
ConClusIon — Is ChInese InvesTmenT  
JusT lIke The resT? or wIll IT kICk-sTarT  
an aFrICan renaIssanCe? 
The central question about Chinese investment in Africa 
is whether it will be more effective at establishing long-term 
sustainable development than the Western model, which has 
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not been as effective as the West would have hoped. Certainly, 
Chinese investment in Africa is popular amongst Africans, even 
more so than aid which comes from the West.160 It is also certain 
that Chinese and Africa fortunes are tied together as there is a 
clear correlation between Chinese and African growth since 
1999.161 Chinese investment in infrastructure and modernizing 
industry has the potential to kick-start stagnant African growth 
and begin a new era of economic development.
However, economic growth will not translate into 
sustainable development if it does not deal with Africa’s limited 
diversification, susceptibility to volatile commodity prices, and 
misgovernance and corruption. While it may not be willing to 
interfere directly, China will want political stability to ensure its 
investments pay off and its supply lines remain intact. This may 
mean supporting authoritarian regimes, as China did in Sudan.162 
Yet, it may also mean supporting new emerging international 
standards for transparency and accountability such as the EITI. 
Significant criticism has been laid on the West’s doorstep for 
the failures that billions of dollars in aid have produced in Africa. 
Whether Chinese investment creates sustainable development in 
Africa will be determined not only by the continued diversification 
and investment in infrastructure, but also by the way African 
society adapts to and propels the changing economic and social 
environment. While Chinese development may not expressly 
include many of the freedoms the West deems to be indicators 
of development, it remains to be seen whether these freedoms 
will be the ends and means of a uniquely African sustainable 
development. 
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